Vietnam's president has been confirmed as the head of the new Communist Party - the country's most powerful role

The former general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, has dominated Vietnamese politics since becoming head of the party in 2011. He was elected for a third term as General Secretary in 2021.

Vietnamese President Tu Lam was confirmed as the new head of the Communist Party on Saturday 19 July following the death of his predecessor.

Lam will be general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the country's most powerful political role, state media said. It was unclear whether Lam would remain in his role as president.

The former general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, has dominated Vietnamese politics since becoming head of the party in 2011. He was elected for a third term as General Secretary in 2021.

PHNOM PENH (Cambodia), Aug. 3 (AP) Vietnamese President Tu Lam was confirmed Saturday July 19 as the new head of the Communist Party following the death of his predecessor.

Lam will be general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the country's most powerful political role, state media said. It was unclear whether Lam would remain in his role as president.

The previous general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, has dominated Vietnamese politics since becoming head of the party in 2011. He was elected as the General Secretary for the third time in 2021. He was an ideologue who saw corruption as the most serious threat facing the party. . .

Lam spent more than four decades at the Ministry of Public Security before becoming a minister in 2016. As Vietnam's top security official, Lam led Trong's sweeping anti-corruption campaign until May, when he became president following the resignation of his predecessor, who stepped down. . . Caught by the campaign.

After the death of President Ho Chi Minh in 1969, his successors in the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) agreed that no one else would simultaneously hold the newly vacant positions of head of party and head of state. Under this agreement, senior members holding four top leadership positions in Vietnam's "Four Pillars"—CPV General Secretary, Regional President, Prime Minister, and President of the National Assembly—have decided national affairs for nearly half a century. However, the voice of the party chief was the most important.

But that changed after the death of President Tran Dai Quang in late September. On October 2, 2018, the 8th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee unanimously nominated General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong for president. In a one-party regime where CPV members hold more than 90 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, Trong's official election as president — which took place on October 23 — was a mere formality.

In tapping Trong to hold the two positions simultaneously, the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam is indirectly influenced by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi Jinping's centralization of power in China. With Trong now holding two key positions in leadership, what are the implications and consequences for Vietnam?

Following China's lead

Towards the end of the Cold War, with the exception of Vietnam, Laos and China, other communist countries combined the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party with the presidency (head of state). After the disintegration of several communist systems in the late 1980s, Laos and China merged the two locations in 1991 and 1993 respectively, seeking greater international integration, particularly in the context of economic globalization. Thus, China was only one of many countries that combined the roles of head of state and head of party. Vietnam was an exception in this regard.

Clearly, Vietnam does not fully follow the Chinese political blueprint. However, when comparing the socio-economic and political changes that both countries have undergone since the Vietnam War, it is undeniable that Vietnam has followed the Chinese model in other key policy areas, with a gap of several years.

Vietnam first followed China's lead on economic policy in the 1980s. In December 1978, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to abolish agricultural collectivization in favor of small-scale private farms. In January 1981, the CPV Secretariat similarly issued Directive 100 on the contracting of agricultural products to farmers as groups and individuals. In 1980, China established the first Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen as a pilot for a major economic program, which many argue was one of the first steps toward expanding the marketization of both the Chinese economy and foreign investment. Six years later, in 1986, the 6th CPV Congress launched a Vietnamese economic reform program known as "Doi Moi", transforming a centrally-planned economy into a multi-component commodity economy operating under market mechanisms.

Vietnam's leadership has also taken China's lead on the issue of corruption. Since 2012, shortly after becoming supreme leader, Xi has waged the largest anti-corruption campaign in modern Chinese history. The CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has served as Beijing's primary enforcement instrument. Likewise, soon after his election as CPV General Secretary for a second term in January 2016, Trong launched a general offensive on corruption with the Party Central Inspection Commission as his chief enforcer.

Considering the aforementioned similarities between the two countries, which are also neighbors, it would not be surprising if the image of a strong and effective leader created by Xi Jinping captivated the Vietnamese leadership determined to fight corruption to preserve the communist regime. Vietnam. Vietnamese leaders, after all, have long admired the power of Chinese leaders.

Restore a strong position

Before the 12th CPV Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, or more precisely during the two terms of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung from 2006 to 2016, the state was very weak. Due to his corrupt rule and immense power as the holder of state resources, Dung not only ignored the remaining three "pillars" of national governance decision-making, but also manipulated institutions in his favor. Corruption under Dung has left the Vietnamese state unable to protect its citizens from property confiscation and harassment by authorities, but also potentially impotent vis-a-vis China, which has consistently threatened Vietnam's territorial and economic sovereignty.

To restore the image of a strong state as well as the Vietnamese Communist Party, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, President Truong Tan Sang and Speaker of the National Assembly Nguyen Sinh Hung formed the Anti-Dung Coalition with Trong as its nucleus. As a result, Dung was expelled from the newly elected Central Committee at the 12th Party Congress. In the context of the anti-corruption campaign, General Secretary Trong's ascension to the presidency as chairman of the CPV Central Committee to Prevent and Fight Corruption is a logical political development.

Trong's supporters will argue that his new state status will help him and the party implement his policies more seamlessly. More importantly, it will allow the public to hold the party more accountable